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Access to Private Equity and Real Firm Activity: 
Evidence from PIPEs 
 
 
JAMES R. BROWN and IOANNIS V. FLOROS* 
 
Abstract 
We study how access to private equity financing affects real firm activities using a broad 
panel of publicly traded U.S. firms that raise external equity through private placements 
(PIPEs) between 1995 and 2008. The public firms relying on PIPEs are generally small, 
high-tech firms that cannot finance investment internally and likely face severe external 
financing constraints; PIPEs are by far the most important source of finance for these 
firms. We show that firms use PIPE inflows to maintain extremely high R&D investment 
ratios and to build substantial cash reserves. We also use GMM techniques that control 
for firm-specific effects and the endogeneity of the decision to raise private equity and 
find that PIPE funding has a substantial impact on corporate investment in cash reserves 
and R&D, and a smaller but significant impact on investment in non-cash working 
capital, but little impact on fixed investment or acquisitions. Our estimates indicate that 
R&D investment initially increases by $0.20-$.25 for each dollar of private equity 
flowing into the firm, and that PIPE funds initially invested in cash ultimately go to 
R&D. These findings offer direct evidence that access to private equity finance has an 
important effect on the key input that drives innovation at the firm- and economy-wide 
levels.    
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I. Introduction 
How important is access to private equity financing for real corporate activities?  
Despite extensive interest in the private equity industry, most evidence on private equity’s 
real impact is based on aggregate comparisons of private equity activity (e.g., LBOs and 
venture capital activity) and real outputs (e.g., patent grants) across countries or industries 
(e.g., Kortum and Lerner (2000); Lerner, Sorensen, and Stromberg (2011)). In contrast, we 
focus in this study on the direct micro-level connections between private equity financing 
and real investment at the firm level. Specifically, we examine the association between 
private equity inflows and new corporate investment by publicly traded firms that raise 
external equity via private placements, commonly referred to as private investments in public 
equity (PIPEs). This is an ideal setting to evaluate the real impact of access to private equity 
funding because detailed financing and investment data is available for public firms in the 
years leading up to and following the private equity inflows. Since a large (and increasing) 
number of firms repeatedly tap private equity markets, we can build a panel of firm-year 
observations on PIPE inflows and investment spending that allows us to both: i) isolate the 
impact of PIPE funding after controlling for firm-specific fixed effects, and ii) instrument for 
the PIPE inflows, as the decision to raise funds via a private placement is clearly 
endogenous. 
We study a broad sample of Compustat firms that conduct at least one private 
placement between 1995 and 2008. PIPE transactions are almost always equity or equity-
linked investments, and the typical firm that raises private equity with a PIPE is small (less 
than $1 million in sales) and generates no internal cash flow, but has a very high market-to-
book ratio (the median value is 7.09), is highly R&D intensive (the median R&D-to-total 
assets ratio is 0.13), and maintains a large stock of cash reserves (the median cash-to-assets 
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ratio is 0.25). These characteristics highlight the potential for financing constraints to have an 
economically significant impact on financing and investment behavior in the firms that rely 
on PIPE financing. In particular, these firms have substantial (intangible) investment 
opportunities relative to internal cash flows, and likely face a high cost of external finance 
given information asymmetries associated with their investment projects and lack of 
collateral value in their assets. For such firms, fluctuations in the availability of PIPE funding 
can have an important impact on both contemporaneous investment spending and the firm’s 
ability to accumulate reserve stocks of cash for investment in future periods.
1
  
Although PIPEs are sometimes viewed as “last resort” financing for firms that face 
severe financing constraints (e.g., Brophy, Ouimet and Sialm (2009)), they are typically not 
viewed as a regular and quantitatively important source of funds, perhaps because aggregate 
proceeds from PIPE transactions pale in comparison to aggregate public stock and debt 
issues.
2
 However, for the firms that turn to private placements, cash inflows from PIPEs are 
substantial, and are typically a much more important source of funds than secondary public 
equity issues and new debt issues. In addition, firms that conduct PIPE transactions tend to 
repeatedly raise funds via private placements: over 70% of the firms in our sample have more 
than one private placement. Amarin Corporation offers a nice illustration of how important 
PIPEs can be in some firms. Between 2000 and 2008, Amarin undertook 12 private 
placements that netted the firm over $150 million, more than offsetting the negative $82.656 
million in internal cash flow it generated over the same period. Furthermore, during this nine 
                                                 
1
 Several studies document a strong connection between cash holdings and financing constraints. See, for 
example, Faulkender and Wang (2006), Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), and Denis and Sibilkov (2010). 
2
 Floros and Sapp (2011) show that annual PIPE gross proceeds amount only to 34.23% of the annual SEO 
gross proceeds up to 2006. They also show that the economic significance of PIPE funds increases sharply over 
time and is especially pronounced in 2007 and 2008.  
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year period that Amarin had large, persistent negative cash flows, it maintained (on average) 
an R&D-to-assets ratio of 17.48% and had $14.24 million in cash reserves at the end of 2008.   
Our primary interest is in exploring how access to private equity impacts real firm 
activities. We begin by examining how firms use the proceeds from PIPE transactions using 
pooled OLS regressions with controls for investment opportunities and other sources of 
finance, similar to the approach Kim and Weisbach (2008) use to study public equity issues. 
On average, firms initially invest over half of every dollar of PIPE financing in cash reserves. 
The remainder is used primarily for R&D and non-cash working capital, with very little of 
the PIPE proceeds going into capital spending, acquisitions, or long-term debt reduction. In 
the years following the infusion of PIPE funding, firms draw down the dollars initially going 
into cash reserves, using the funds almost exclusively for R&D investment. Thus, the vast 
majority of PIPE financing ultimately goes into R&D.     
Of course, the decision to raise PIPE financing is endogenous and jointly determined 
with the decision on how to spend the funds. To deal with this endogeneity we estimate 
dynamic models using a “system” GMM estimator that uses lagged values of all regression 
variables as instruments (see Arrelano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998)). 
This approach is used in a number of recent studies (e.g., Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000); 
Beck and Levine (2004); Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta (2008); Quinn and Toyoda (2008); 
Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins, and Smith (2011)) and is an attractive way to deal with 
endogeneity when no obvious external instruments are available.
3
 In addition, Almeida, 
Campello, and Galvao (2010) show that an approach like we employ is a tractable way to 
deal with measurement error in the explanatory variables (namely, the market-to-book ratio) 
                                                 
3
 Of course, this approach has limitations: namely, it returns unbiased estimates only if a number of somewhat 
restrictive conditions hold in the data. We supply standard tests for these conditions with the regression output. 
4 
 
that can bias inference in investment regressions (e.g., Erickson and Whited (2000)). Thus, 
the results using this approach allow us to make stronger inference about the causal 
connections between private equity financing and firm-level investment.  
The GMM estimates show a quantitatively important link between PIPE financing 
and firm investment in both cash reserves and R&D. Across all firms, the GMM estimates 
indicate that for every $1 shock to PIPE financing, firm investment in cash reserves changes 
by approximately $0.60 and investment in R&D changes by approximately $0.26. Investment 
in non-cash working capital is also somewhat sensitive to PIPE funding (changes by 
approximately $0.13), but variation in access to PIPE financing has a much smaller impact 
on investment in fixed capital and spending on acquisitions ($0.05 and $0.04, respectively). 
As expected, R&D investment is most sensitive to PIPE funding in the firms that frequently 
raise funds via private placements and appear the most dependent on private equity.  
These findings indicate a strong connection between private equity financing and 
innovative activity at the firm-level. While prior studies focus on private equity and 
innovative outputs (such as patents) after controlling for R&D investment (e.g., Kortum and 
Lerner (2000)), our results highlight the importance of private equity for directly funding 
R&D, the key input for innovation at the firm level. In particular, our findings show that 
funds raised in private placements support R&D investment in firms with limited internal 
funds and little or no access to public debt and equity markets. Furthermore, the importance 
of PIPEs for innovative activity also works through cash reserves: innovative firms save a 
significant fraction of PIPE inflows as cash reserves that are used to fund R&D in future 
periods. When we include the change in cash reserves as a source of R&D finance, we find a 
significant negative coefficient, suggesting that firms draw down cash reserves to support 
5 
 
R&D investment. Thus, our findings show that access to PIPE financing not only affects 
current period R&D spending, but also influences the ability firms have for maintaining 
R&D in future periods.           
Our findings also offer new evidence on the increasingly relevant connections 
between R&D investment, external equity issues, and cash holdings in financially 
constrained firms. R&D is by far the most important investment for firms that raise PIPE 
funds – e.g., R&D ratios are over five times larger than capital spending ratios among the 
firms in our sample.
4
 Recent studies show that R&D is financed extensively with external 
stock issues, particularly in younger firms (Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009)). In addition, 
the rise in R&D investment has been accompanied by an increase in corporate cash holdings 
(Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009)) and an increasing propensity for firms to invest the proceeds 
from share issues in cash reserves (McLean (2011)). Consistent with these studies, our 
findings show that PIPE inflows have a significant impact on R&D investment in firms that 
appear “constrained” at the margin. Furthermore, we show that the firms dependent on PIPE 
funding at the margin invest the majority of all new equity financing in substantial stocks of 
cash reserves that they use, in turn, to finance R&D spending. These results suggest that: i) 
financing constraints have a quantitatively important impact on R&D, ii) the financing of 
R&D is an important reason for the large “precautionary” cash holdings in the firms we 
study, and iii) PIPE inflows are an important source of funding for these precautionary cash 
reserves.      
                                                 
4
 Our sample consists only of PIPE issuing firms and is skewed toward R&D intensive firms, but the trend 
toward increased R&D investment is broad. For example, Brown and Petersen (2009) document a decline in 
fixed investment and substantial increase in R&D spending in a broad sample manufacturing firms over 1970-
2006.  
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Our study also contributes to the emerging literature focused specifically on PIPEs. 
Public firms’ increasing use of PIPEs has attracted substantial interest in recent years.5 
Several studies emphasize that private placements are concentrated in the kinds of firms 
especially likely to face high costs of raising external funds: smaller, younger firms with little 
or no internally generated cash flow and potentially severe information problems (e.g., Wu 
(2004); Gomes and Phillips (2007); and Brophy, Ouimet and Sialm (2009)). However, 
although a number of studies following Wruck (1989) examine the stock price performance 
of firms issuing private placements (e.g., Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck and Rees (2002); 
Krishnamurthy, Spindt, Subramaniam, and Woidtke (2005); Dai (2007); Brophy, Ouimet, 
and Sialm (2009); and Chaplinsky and Haushalter (2010)), this literature has generally not 
focused on the real effects of PIPEs.
6
 Furthermore, following an early precedent, almost all 
studies of PIPEs ignore offerings after the first transaction by a PIPE issuer (e.g., Freund, 
John and Vasudevan (2006) and Huson, Malatesta and Parrino (2010)). Our findings show 
that firms regularly and repeatedly use PIPE financing and that access to this financing has a 
substantial impact on their real investment behavior.       
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we provide additional background 
on the potential connection between private equity financing and innovative activity. We 
discuss our sample in section three and present the main results in section four. In the final 
section we summarize and discuss our main findings.  
  
                                                 
5
 The Wall Street Journal now regularly publishes statistics on aggregate PIPE investment activity (see, for 
example, “PIPE Rebound? Wait Til Next Quarter”, October 21, 2010, “Market Woes Stall 2Q PIPE Activity 
But Could Lead To More Later”, July 21, 2010 or “Risk Mitigation Could Lead To a Better PIPEline In 2010”, 
January 21, 2010).  
6
 One recent exception is Dai (2011), who examines firm operating performance in the years surrounding PIPE 
transactions. 
7 
 
II. Private Equity and R&D Investment 
A. Private equity and real activity 
There are several theoretical reasons that private equity financing may be important 
for R&D investment in firms with substantial intangible investment opportunities but limited 
internal funds. Notably, such firms likely have limited access to new debt for financing R&D 
because: i) debt contracts are poorly suited for financing risky investments with highly 
volatile returns (e.g., Stiglitz (1985)), ii) R&D investment is largely intangible and lacks 
collateral value, and iii) the costs of financial distress can be particularly severe for R&D 
intensive firms that take on additional debt (e.g., Opler and Titman (1994)). Consistent with 
these ideas, Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009) find that internal and external equity 
finance are the primary marginal sources of finance for R&D investment in young firms, and 
a large number of studies document a negative link between leverage and R&D spending 
across firms (e.g., Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984), Titman and Wessels (1988), Fama and 
French (2002), Hall (2002), Kayhan and Titman (2007), Hall and Lerner (2010)).   
Though R&D is an “equity-dependent” investment, external issues of public equity 
can be costly for R&D-intensive firms. Information asymmetries between firms and potential 
investors can be severe, both because of the nature of the high-tech investment and because 
firms may be reluctant to reveal information about their activities (Kamien and Schwartz 
(1978)), which can increase the cost of public stock issues (Myers and Majluf (1984)). In 
addition, the transaction costs associated with public stock issues can be large, particularly in 
smaller firms (Lee, Lochhead, Ritter, and Zhao (1996)).       
Private equity has several advantages over both debt and public equity issues for 
financing R&D. Relative to debt, private equity investors share in upside returns and should 
be less concerned with limited collateral value. Relative to public stock issues, private equity 
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investors can have information advantages because of industry expertise and because of 
repeated or staged financing. For example, Billett and Floros (2011) show that corporate 
private investors are operational in the same industries as PIPE issuers and have more 
information about the issuing company’s projects than public investors. In addition, for some 
firms, the overall costs associated with private placements can be significantly lower when 
compared to public issues. Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2010) document an economically 
significant decrease in PIPE price discounts in the later years of the 1995-2007 time period, 
which they attribute to the improving financials of PIPE issuers as well as the changes in the 
contracting process. Further, Dai (2011) shows that firms with greater agency costs are 
typically charged higher discounts, but staging helps mitigate the agency and information 
problems and thus lowers PIPE discounts and reduces the cost of financing for these firms. 
Thus, the cash inflows from private placements can potentially allow firms to undertake (or 
maintain) investment projects that would otherwise be bypassed due to high financing costs.       
B. Private placements 
Beginning in the mid-1990s, there is a sharp increase in private placements as a 
source of external capital for publicly traded U.S. firms. Between 1995 and 2008 aggregate 
gross proceeds from private investments in public equity (PIPEs) increased from $1.33 
billion to $117.15 billion (Floros and Sapp (2011)). At the firm-level, PIPEs emerged as an 
important and frequently used source of external equity finance, particularly among smaller 
public firms with limited (and often negative) internal cash flows. For example, our analysis 
shows that over 70% of PIPE transactions between 1995 and 2008 were undertaken by firms 
with more than one private placement. Nonetheless, almost all studies of PIPEs either 
exclude or ignore offerings after the first PIPE transaction (e.g., Freund, John, and 
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Vasudevan (2006); and Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2010)). One exception is Floros and 
Sapp (2011), who show that the majority of PIPE transactions involve firms that self-select 
into repeated PIPE transactions. Another exception is Dai (2011), who studies the causes and 
consequences of staging in the setting of repeated PIPE offerings. She finds similarities to 
venture capital staging, since staging is used by investors as a monitoring mechanism to 
mitigate information asymmetry problems and agency costs. She finds that firms with staged 
financing have significantly better long run stock performance than their single round peers.  
The findings in several studies suggest that access to PIPE financing may be an 
important marginal source of external finance for issuing firms. For example, Ellis and Twite 
(2008) argue that high levels of information asymmetry and significant future growth options 
cause equity issuers to choose PIPEs rather than SEOs. Chen, Dai, and Schatzberg (2010) 
argue that firms choosing PIPEs instead of SEOs lack access to the SEO market due to 
information asymmetry and weak operating performance. Martos-Vila (2011) shows 
theoretically that private equity financing can be optimal for companies plagued by 
information asymmetries. Chaplinsky and Haushalter (2010) find that PIPE issuers perform 
poorly before and after the PIPE offering, suggesting that PIPEs enable these firms to obtain 
financing that would otherwise be unavailable to them. Similarly, Brophy, Ouimet, and Sialm 
(2009) examine the performance of PIPEs invested by hedge funds versus all other investor 
types over 1995-2002 and argue that hedge funds provide funding for companies that are 
otherwise constrained from raising equity capital. We complement and extend this literature 
by directly exploring how the financing provided by PIPE issues affects real investment 
decisions in firms that appear to face severe financing constraints.     
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III. Data and Sample Statistics 
A. Sample construction 
 We use Sagient Research’s Placement Tracker as our data source for information on 
PIPE issues. We start with 14,258 PIPE offerings conducted between 1995 and 2008, which 
is essentially the entire universe of PIPE issues during this period. The universe of PIPE 
transactions amounts to 6,827 distinct PIPE issuers that tap private markets either once or 
multiple times. We then match the data on PIPE issuers with firm-year financing and 
investment data from Compustat. A significant fraction of PIPE issuers are very small firms 
that trade over-the-counter and thus are not covered in Compustat.
7
 After excluding the firms 
without Compustat coverage and dropping firms from financial (SIC 6000-6999) and 
regulated industries (SIC 4900-4999), we are left with 1,532 firms that conduct either one or 
repeated PIPEs during the 1995-2008 period. Starting with the year of the first PIPE, we add 
firm-year financing and investment data from Compustat, giving us a panel of approximately 
7,636 firm-year observations, with PIPE offerings occurring in 3,252 of those firm-years.
8
 
Finally, we include information on common stock public offerings from the Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) database. All variables are winsorized at the 1% level.  
B. PIPEs as a source of funds 
To illustrate the importance of PIPE financing for our sampled firms, we begin in 
Figure 1 by comparing the frequency and magnitude of PIPE and SEO issuances across all 
sample years 1995-2008. Panel A of Figure 1 shows that for the firms we study, PIPEs are 
much more frequent than SEOs in each of the sample years. In particular, between 2000 and 
                                                 
7
 In accordance with Floros and Sapp (2011), we find that 21% of the entire universe of PIPEs spanning the 
period of 1995-2010 are traded on the Pink/OTC markets. For all these companies Compustat information is not 
available.   
8
 Firms often conduct multiple PIPE transactions in the same fiscal year.  In those cases, we aggregate the PIPE 
financings into a single fiscal year total that matches the fiscal year data from Compustat. The number of 
distinct PIPE transactions among our sampled firms is 4,069 (as shown in Figure 1).  
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2008, firms in our sample averaged approximately 291 PIPE issues but only 34 SEOs per 
year. In Panel B of Figure 1 we plot the yearly average gross proceeds from PIPE and SEO 
issues across our sampled firms. The figure shows that, after incorporating all firm-years of 
our sample, PIPE proceeds are larger (on average) than SEO proceeds in each year between 
1995 and 2008.
9
 
In Figure 2 we track the cumulative amount of financing the firms in our sample raise 
from key sources in the years following the first PIPE transaction (t=0). For each financing 
source, we sum values over the years since the initial PIPE and scale the total by the book 
value of assets at t=0.  We then find and plot an average value at each subsequent year across 
the firms in our sample. The figure shows that, on average, PIPE financing dominates other 
financing sources in the years following the first private placement. The increase in the 
average amount of (cumulative) PIPE financing in the years after t=0 reflects the significant 
fraction of firms that have multiple private placements. On average, SEOs and new debt 
issues are both positive but very small sources of finance. Cumulative cash flows, on the 
other hand, are substantially negative; however, cash inflows from PIPEs are more than 
sufficient to offset these negative values. For example, the average cumulative PIPE to initial 
assets ratio over the five years following the first PIPE is 2.152 and the corresponding cash 
flow ratio is -1.369.    
C. Descriptive statistics for the PIPE sample 
In Table I we report descriptive statistics on key firm financing and investment 
variables for the sample of PIPE issuers in the period 1995-2008. We report median values 
(mean values show a similar pattern) for all variables except PIPE gross proceeds and the 
                                                 
9
 This is driven by the fact that SEO proceeds are typically zero for the firms we sample.  If we compare only 
positive SEO and PIPE values the average SEO is larger than the average PIPE.  SEOs are positive in just 480 
firm-years of our entire sample. 
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total gross proceeds from the sale of common and preferred stock. Stock issues are lumpy 
and the median value across firm-years is zero, which potentially understates the importance 
of stock issues to the firm. All firm-years are included in our sample regardless of the 
presence of a PIPE transaction. For comparison, we also report values for all non-PIPE-
issuing Compustat firms over the same period and we test for differences across the PIPE and 
non-PIPE samples using the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
10
  
 The first two rows in Table I show that firms relying on private placements use more 
external equity than the typical publicly traded firm and that PIPE proceeds are the primary 
source of external equity for these firms. For the PIPE sample, the average PIPEs to assets 
ratio (0.2572) is 74% of the overall total stock issues ratio (0.3487). In addition, firms in our 
sample generate less internal cash flow, use less long-term debt, and maintain substantially 
larger stocks of cash reserves than other publicly traded firms. Perhaps most importantly, 
firms in the PIPE sample have a very high market-to-book ratio (7.09) and are extremely 
R&D intensive (0.1314).   
 Thus, PIPE issuers are unique from both financing as well as investments perspective 
as they utilize private markets as their main financing source and focus on R&D projects 
rather than fixed capital investments. Furthermore, the descriptive statistics indicate that 
PIPE-issuing firms are precisely the firms where finance can have an important impact on 
both real investment (R&D and capital spending) and financial-side adjustments (increases in 
cash reserves or reductions in long-term debt). Firms in the PIPEs sample appear to have a 
large number of intangible investment opportunities but limited internal funds, and they are 
clearly relying extensively on external (private) equity to finance these opportunities. In 
                                                 
10
 As with the sample of PIPE issuing firms, the Compustat sample excludes all utilities (SIC 4900-4900) and 
all financials (SIC 6000-6999). We allow only firms with no PIPE issues in the Compustat sample.  
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addition, the firms relying on PIPEs appear financially constrained based on a number of 
commonly used ex ante proxies for financial constraints: they are small and consistently 
unprofitable, and they pay no dividends.   
 In Table II we report separate descriptive statistics for firms sorted based on the 
number of PIPE transactions they undertake during the sample period. Columns (1)-(4) 
report statistics for firms with one, two, three, and more than three PIPE transactions, 
respectively. Table II shows that the firms least reliant on PIPE financing are larger, generate 
more internal cash flow, and have lower R&D to assets ratios than firms with more PIPE 
transactions. Among firms with more PIPE transactions, internal cash flow declines (and 
becomes negative in the category of PIPE issuers with more than three PIPE transactions) 
and the magnitude of PIPE financing, the level of precautionary cash reserves, and R&D 
intensity all increase sharply. In addition, firms with more frequent PIPE issuances have less 
tangibility in their assets, do not issue any new long-term debt, and have shorter debt 
maturities.
11
 These statistics suggest that access to private equity financing is particularly 
important for real activity in the firms with multiple PIPE transactions.
12
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  In non-tabulated results, we analyze the debt maturity structure across firms according to the frequency of 
their PIPE transactions. Specifically, we analyze the percentage of firms in each of the three categories in Table 
II that issue short-term debt maturing within 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 calendar years, respectively. We find that a 
significantly larger fraction of firms with at least three PIPE transactions have short-term debt maturing in one 
year than do firms with just one PIPE transaction (14.03% versus 10.21%). This evidence reinforces the 
argument that frequent PIPE issuers repeatedly tap private equity markets as they need to service their 
immediate operating needs.   
12
 We also examine the financial characteristics of the PIPE issuers when splitting the sample into positive and 
negative net cash flow firms, according to their cash flow balances the year before each PIPE issuance. 
Negative net cash flow firms are smaller, have higher cash balances, higher valuation multiples, lower 
acquisitions and capital expenditures, lower maturity of short-term debt and higher R&D levels when compared 
to the positive net cash flow PIPE issuers.  
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IV. PIPE Funding and Real Investment 
A. Empirical specification 
We start the formal analysis by exploring the connection between PIPE funding and 
firm financing and investment activity. An extensive literature following Fazzari, Hubbard, 
and Petersen (1998) tests for the real influence of financing constraints by examining the 
sensitivity of fixed investment to fluctuations in internal cash flow. Our empirical approach 
generally follows this literature except we include other key sources of finance (besides cash 
flow), and we examine the link between finance and a number of alternative uses of funds 
(besides fixed investment). We estimate the following dynamic specification: 
Yj,t = 1Yj,t-1 + 1Qj,t-1 + 2Ln(Assets)j,t-1 + 3Salesj,t + 4CashFlowj,t + 5dCashj,t  
+ 6PIPEj,t + 7NewLTDebtj,t + 8SEOj,t + 9OtherStkj,t + FixedEffects + ejt.  (1) 
  We are interested in the marginal effect that PIPE inflows in firm  j in period t have 
on contemporaneous spending, where Y is either investment in R&D, spending on fixed 
investment (Capx), cash spending on acquisitions (Acquire), investment in cash reserves 
(dCash), investment in (non-cash) working capital (dWC), or reduction in long-term debt 
outstanding (LtDbtReduc). We control for investment opportunities with the beginning-of-
period market-to-book ratio (Q) and the contemporaneous level of sales (the results are 
similar if we use sales growth instead of sales). We also control for firm size using the log of 
beginning-of-period firm assets (Ln(Assets)) and for other key sources of finance. The 
internal financing variables include current period cash flow (CashFlow) gross of both R&D 
and capital spending (income before extraordinary items plus depreciation plus R&D) and, in 
all regressions except for the investment in cash regressions, the period change in cash 
reserves (dCash). We thus look at both the propensity to invest PIPE proceeds in cash (dCash 
is the dependent variable), and we control for the potential for cash reserves to be a source of 
15 
 
funds for other uses (dCash is an explanatory variable), in which case the coefficient on 
dCash should be negative since reductions in cash release funds for investment.
13
 In addition 
to PIPE issues, the external financing variables include proceeds from new long-term debt 
issues (NewLTDebt), secondary stock offerings (SEO), and other (net) funds from stock 
issues (OtherStk), which would include things like employee exercises of stock options.
14
 All 
variables except Ln(Assets) are scaled by the beginning of period book value of assets.  We 
estimate both pooled OLS regressions with industry- and year-fixed effects, as well as GMM  
regressions with firm- and year-fixed effects. In all regressions the standard errors are 
clustered at the firm-level and are thus robust to any arbitrary form of within firm serial 
correlation (Petersen (2009)).       
B. Baseline results 
 Baseline estimates are reported in Table III. We begin with pooled regressions that 
include all firm-years of data and industry and year fixed effects. The industry fixed effects 
control for all time invariant determinants of investment at the industry level, while the year 
fixed effects control for any aggregate shocks that impact firm-level investment spending, 
such as macro-economic fluctuations. While this approach exploits both between- and 
within-firm variation and imposes the least data restrictions, there are several reasons to 
expect the OLS estimates to be biased, and we address these concerns below. In particular, at 
this stage we do not deal with the endogeneity of the decision to raise PIPE financing; rather, 
                                                 
13
 We have also estimated the regressions without including “dCash” as an explanatory variable and all our 
main findings and conclusions are unaffected. As Brown and Petersen (2011) discuss, controlling for changes in 
cash can be particularly important when evaluating how access to finance affects investments (like R&D) with 
high adjustment costs. Firms have strong incentives to use cash reserves to buffer the flow of R&D spending 
from transitory finance shocks; since this smoothing activity will make R&D less volatile than key sources of 
finance, a regression with no controls for cash management can readily underestimate the true impact that 
finance has on R&D. Also see Brown, Martinsson, and Petersen (2011). 
14
 We measure other stock issues as gross funds from stock issues minus proceeds from PIPEs minus proceeds 
from SEOs minus stock repurchases. 
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the estimates in Table III should be interpreted as showing the marginal relation between 
PIPE inflows and investment after controlling for the fixed effects, other financing sources, 
and firm growth opportunities.   
In order, columns (1)-(6) report regression results for R&D, capital spending, 
acquisitions, change in cash holdings, change in non-cash working capital, and reduction in 
long-term debt outstanding. The first column shows a strong positive link between PIPE 
proceeds and R&D spending, while the next two columns show a positive but considerably 
smaller link between PIPE proceeds and spending on both fixed capital and acquisitions. The 
estimates suggest that, on average, each additional dollar of PIPE proceeds is associated with 
18 cents of new R&D spending, five cents of spending on fixed investment, and seven cents 
on acquisitions. Column four shows that PIPE issues share a particularly strong association 
with corporate cash holdings. In particular, corporate cash reserves increase by 
approximately 56 cents for every additional dollar of PIPE financing.  The final two columns 
show that PIPE issues are associated with a modest increase in non-cash working capital (13 
cents) and a small reduction in long-term debt (four cents).       
C. Cash reserves and the cumulative impact of PE financing 
 The strong connection between PIPE proceeds and changes in cash holdings suggests 
that the firms we study initially invest a substantial fraction of all new PIPE financing in 
cash. This cash saving behavior is consistent with cash reserves serving an important 
precautionary role in firms that face binding financing constraints (e.g., Almeida, Campello 
and Weisbach (2004)). Such precautionary cash reserves should be particularly important for 
the firms we study given their extensive reliance on external finance and very high R&D 
intensity. For these firms, we may observe a relatively small fraction of PIPE financing going 
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immediately into new investment, but the remainder that is initially in cash can be used to 
fund investment in future periods. Thus, the cumulative impact that PIPE financing has on 
investment works directly through the initial PIPE inflow, and indirectly through PIPE-
funded cash reserves.     
 One way to directly gauge the cumulative impact that PIPE inflows have on firm-
level investment spending is to follow the approach Kim and Weisbach (2009) use to 
evaluate the motivations for public equity offerings. Kim and Weisbach (2009) study how 
firms use the capital raised in public equity offerings in subsequent years. Applying their 
approach to our setting, we estimate the following regression:  
Y = 1ln[(PIPE proceeds/TA0) + 1] + 2ln[(other sources/TA0) + 1] +3ln(TA0) + Year + 
Industry + e. 
 
Here, the dependent variable is the cumulative change in investment spending in the years 
following a PIPE issue (reported for one, two and three year intervals), and 1 measures the 
cumulative impact that a PIPE inflow in a given period has in the years following the issue, 
after controlling for other financing inflows during the interval (“other sources”), the initial 
size of total assets, and industry and year fixed effects. We expect that an increasing share of 
every dollar of PIPE funding will go into R&D as firms spend down their cash reserves in the 
years following a PIPE issue.     
 The results are reported in Table IV. We only report estimates of 1, the coefficient 
on PIPE raised in the current period (t=0). The results are generally consistent with Table III, 
but they show directly that PIPE dollars initially going into cash reserves ultimately fund 
R&D expenditures. In column one, the coefficient on PIPE proceeds increases sharply from 
0.255 to 0.469 as we accumulate the change R&D over the t=1 to t=3 interval. At the same 
time, column four shows that the change in cash reserves declines as we examine longer 
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intervals after each PIPE issue, indicating that firms spend down PIPE dollars initially 
invested in cash. In sharp contrast to R&D, the coefficient estimates in the capital spending 
(column two), acquisition spending (column three), and long-term debt reduction (column 
six) regressions are relatively modest and do not increase rapidly as we sum over longer 
intervals following the PIPE issue.   
D.  Dynamic GMM regressions 
The findings presented thus far indicate that PIPE funds are the key marginal source 
of R&D finance for the firms we examine, and they highlight the potential for fluctuations in 
the availability of PIPE financing to limit R&D investment in these firms. One potential 
source of bias in the pooled OLS results (Table III) is omitted firm-specific factors that 
influence both the propensity to raise PIPE financing and to invest the funds in certain ways 
(e.g., increased R&D and cash holdings). We therefore move to regressions with firm fixed 
effects that control for all omitted, but time invariant, firm characteristics that can influence 
these decisions, such as geographic location (which might impact the access that firms have 
to PIPE finance or highly skilled labor) and managerial characteristics. However, including 
firm fixed effects in specifications with lagged dependent variables introduces the well-
known dynamic panel bias (Nickell (1981)). We therefore proceed by estimating equation (1) 
with the “system” GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998)). This approach is appealing for our purposes for several reasons; most importantly, it 
allows us to simultaneously: i) control for firm fixed effects and address the resulting 
dynamic panel bias, ii) account for the endogeneity of the key financial variables, including 
PIPE issues, and iii) address the potential for measurement error in the market-to-book ratio 
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to bias coefficient estimates on other regression variables.15  
 The systems approach jointly estimates the dynamic regression specification in both 
differences and levels. Blundell and Bond (1998) show that including the regression in levels 
can lead to marked improvement over the widely used “difference GMM” estimator 
(Arellano and Bond (1991)), particularly when there is substantial persistence in the 
explanatory variables.16 Our primary results use lagged levels dated t-2 to t-4 to instrument 
the regression in differences and lagged differences dated t-1 to instrument the regression in 
levels. To assess instrument validity we report a Hansen J-test of the null that the over-
identifying restrictions are valid, a difference-in-Hansen test that evaluates the validity of the 
additional instruments required for systems estimation (i.e., the validity of the instruments 
used in the levels equation), and an m2 test for second-order autocorrelation in the first-
differenced residuals. The results are similar if we use alternative instrument sets, including 
starting the instruments with lagged levels dated t-3 (which are valid even if the error term is 
MA(1)).  
 The estimates are reported in Table V with standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation in parenthesis. The firm and observation 
counts in Table V are smaller than in the preceding tables because the estimator relies on 
lagged values as instruments and thus firms with an insufficient number of observations are 
dropped. We continue to find: i) a strong positive link between PIPE issues and investment in 
both R&D and cash reserves, ii) a positive link between PIPE issues and investment in non-
cash working capital, and iii) a positive but relatively weak link between PIPE issues and 
                                                 
15
 Hankins and Flannery (2011) highlight the benefits of the system estimator for dynamic panel analysis of 
corporate finance data. Almeida, Campello and Galvo (2010) provide evidence on the benefits of instrumental 
approaches like ours for dealing with measurement error in investment regressions.    
16
 This approach is only valid if an additional moment restriction holds in the data: differences in the right-hand 
side variables in equation (1) must not be correlated with the firm-specific effect.   
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spending on fixed investment and acquisitions. The results also show a negative link between 
changes in cash reserves and R&D investment, indicating that the firms we study sometimes 
rely on their large stocks of cash reserves to finance R&D spending.    
 The results in Table V offer even stronger evidence that access to private equity 
financing (in the form of PIPEs) directly impacts R&D investment in the firms we study. 
Further, access to PIPE funds allows firms with little or no internally generated cash flow to 
increase cash reserves, which they subsequently use to finance ongoing operations, the most 
important of which is the flow of annual R&D expenditures. One way to interpret the GMM 
results is that, all else equal, firms will increase R&D spending by approximately 26 cents 
and cash reserves by 60 cents for each $1 exogenous increase in the supply of private equity 
financing, with the remaining funds going into working capital and other operational needs.        
The results in Table V also show several differences in the marginal association 
between other sources of finance and firm investment. In particular, internal cash flow is only 
weakly related to R&D, fixed investment, and acquisition spending, likely because cash flow 
is low and often negative in our sample, which drives down the estimated investment-cash 
flow relation (e.g., Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004)).17 In addition, PIPEs, SEOs, and other 
external equity issues share a similar positive relation with R&D spending (e.g., coefficient 
estimates between 0.25 and 0.27), indicating that the marginal propensity to invest external 
equity issues in R&D is similar for private or public issues. Although the marginal effects are 
similar, SEOs and other equity issues are a much less important source of funds for the firms 
we study (see Table II) and therefore have a much smaller impact than PIPEs on the amount 
                                                 
17
 If we drop years with negative cash flows (which account for a large share of our sample) we recover a 
positive, significant link between cash flow and R&D.  
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of R&D investment in our sampled firms.
18
 Finally, both PIPE and SEO issues share a strong 
positive relation with changes in cash reserves, but firms initially store a much larger fraction 
of each SEO issue in cash (the coefficient on SEO proceeds is 0.848 in the cash regression).
19
   
E.  Frequent PIPE Issuers 
 As discussed above, some firms routinely raise external equity via PIPEs. The 
descriptive statistics show that frequent PIPE issuers are more R&D intensive, have lower 
cash flows, and maintain larger stocks of cash reserves. In Table VI we consider whether the 
impact of PIPE financing is different for the firms most reliant on PIPE financing. Panel A 
reports results for the frequent issuers only (at least three PIPE issues during the sample 
period), and panel B reports results for the remaining (infrequent issuers) firms. Comparing 
panels A and B reveals several interesting differences. Most importantly, R&D is much more 
sensitive to PIPE financing for the frequent issuers, while changes in non-cash working 
capital are less sensitive. These results further highlight the link between R&D and PIPE 
financing. For frequent issuers, PIPEs are by far the most important source of finance (see 
Table II). The vast majority of each dollar of PIPE financing goes into R&D and cash 
reserves, and cash reserves are then used to finance R&D. The importance of PIPEs as a 
source of funds, together with the estimates in Panel A suggest that R&D would fall 
substantially if the frequent issuers no longer had access to private equity.     
F. Does Investor Type Matter? 
 In the final table (Table VII) we consider whether there are systematic differences in 
                                                 
18
 The results for public equity issues are consistent with other recent studies that emphasize a strong connection 
between public share issues and R&D investment (e.g., Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009) and Kim and 
Weisbach (2009)). However, the limited use of SEOs, together with the strong sensitivity for R&D to PIPE 
funding, indicates that PIPEs and public share issues are not perfect substitutes for our sampled firms.    
19
 One explanation for this finding is that SEOs are not a reliable source of funding for the firms we study, so a 
larger fraction is saved in precautionary cash reserves rather than used for immediate operational needs. Our 
estimates also indicate a stronger propensity to save than McLean (2011), who documents an increasing 
propensity for firms to invest stock issues in cash reserves in recent decades. 
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the impact PE inflows have depending on source of the PIPE funding. The regressions mirror 
those presented in the prior tables, but here we report only the coefficient estimate on PIPE 
funds for each of the dependent variables. In Panel A we look only at firms receiving PIPE 
funding primarily from hedge funds, and in Panel B we look at firms with PIPE funding 
provided by all other non-hedge fund suppliers (e.g., corporations, private equity firms, and 
venture capitalists).
20
 We focus on hedge funds because the role of hedge funds in the private 
placement market has received considerable (and often negative) attention (e.g., Dai (2007); 
Brophy, Ouimet, and Sialm (2009)). The results indicate a slightly stronger link between 
PIPE funds and investment in R&D and non-cash working capital when hedge funds are the 
primary suppliers of capital. These results suggest that firms turning to hedge funds might be 
especially dependent on PIPE funding for immediate operational needs. However, the overall 
patterns are similar for all firms that rely extensively on PIPE financing, irrespective of the 
primary source for that finance. 
 We next sort firms based on whether they stay with the same supplier of PIPE funds 
(Panel C) or switch suppliers (Panel D) across financing transactions. For this analysis, we 
focus only on firms with information on the identity of the PIPE supplier and more than one 
PIPE transaction, which reduces the sample considerably. Relative to the firms switching 
suppliers, the firms that stay with the same supplier tend to invest a smaller fraction of PIPE 
financing in R&D. Though the limited sample size tempers the conclusions we can draw 
from these results, the weaker link between PIPE financing and R&D in the firms that do not 
switch potentially suggests that R&D in those firms is less sensitive to shocks in the 
availability of external finance, perhaps because of the relationship they have with key 
                                                 
20
 We sort firms into these categories based on the identity of the leading supplier type at the time of the firm’s 
first PIPE transaction. The sample size declines in Table VII because we do not have information on the PE 
supplier for all firms.  
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suppliers of finance. Thus, the full set of results in Table VII suggests that the real impact of 
PIPE financing is not sensitive to investor identity, but it may differ according to the 
relationships PIPE issuers have with PIPE investors. We believe the potential for 
‘relationship PIPE financing’ is an important topic for future research.         
V.  Conclusions 
 Our study offers new evidence on the real impact of firm access to private equity 
finance.  Specifically, we study the affect cash inflows from private placements (PIPEs) have 
on firm-level investment decisions. We show that the firms most reliant on PIPE financing 
are extremely R&D intensive, generate little internal cash flow, and maintain sizable stocks 
of cash reserves. These firms likely have particular difficulty raising external debt or 
undertaking public stock offerings, in part because of the intangible and highly variable 
nature of R&D investment. As a result, PIPE financing is their primary source of external 
capital, and our findings show that access to this financing has an economically important 
and statistically significant impact on their R&D expenditures. Our results thus reveal a 
direct connection between PIPE financing and innovative activity at the firm-level. 
 Our study makes several contributions. Most importantly, we offer novel evidence on 
a largely unexplored mechanism – the funding of R&D – that connects private equity with 
innovation and, potentially, long-run economic performance. In so doing, our results show 
that financing frictions can exert a binding constraint on corporate investment in R&D, and 
that access to private equity financing can partially relax those constraints. In particular, our 
findings show that PIPEs have emerged as a key source of external finance for R&D-
intensive public firms, and our estimates suggest that their R&D intensity would decline 
sharply if they did not have access to this financing. 
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Figure 1 
Distribution of PIPEs and Common Stock SEOs 1995-2008 
In Panel A, the figure shows the number of PIPEs and common stock SEOs each year over the sample period 
1995-2008. The sample is 4,069 PIPE transactions and 480 public equity SEOs conducted by the sample of 
PIPE issuers described in section III. The source of information for PIPEs is PlacementTracker provided by 
Sagient Research and for common stock SEOs is SDC Platinum provided by Thomson Reuters. In Panel B, the 
figure shows the annual mean gross proceeds for PIPEs and common stock SEOs for the same sample and time 
period. PIPE and SEO values are set to zero if the firm had no issues in that year.  Figures are in millions of 
U.S. dollars. 
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Figure 2 
Sources of Finance for PIPE Sample 
The figure shows the cumulative amount of internal and external capital raised by firms in the five years 
following their first PIPE transaction. The financial variables are accumulated across time and scaled by the 
book value of total assets in the year of the first PIPE transaction.   
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Table I 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Table I displays median values of key firm characteristics for the sample of firms with at least one PIPE 
transaction between 1995 and 2008 and a comparison sample of non-PIPE issuing firms in Compustat (for the 
PIPE proceeds ratio and the gross stock issues ratio we report the mean values). The PIPE proceeds ratio is total 
PIPE gross proceeds over total assets. Gross stock issues ratio is sales of common and preferred stock over total 
assets. Sales ratio is sales over total assets, cash ratio is cash and cash equivalents over total assets, repurchase 
ratio is the purchase of common and preferred stock over total assets, acquisitions ratio is the cash amount spent 
on acquisitions over total assets, tangibility ratio is Net PPE minus inventories over total assets, net assets is 
total assets minus cash, CAPEX ratio is capital expenditures over total assets, R&D ratio is research and 
development expenditures over total assets, leverage ratio is the sum of long-term and short-term debt over total 
assets issuance of new long-term debt ratio is the total issuance of new long-term debt over total assets, cash 
flow ratio is the sum of income before extraordinary items and any existing research and development expenses 
over total assets, dividends ratio is the ratio of total dividends over total assets. The last column reports 
Wilcoxon z-statistics with p-values in brackets (for the gross stock issues ratio we report the paired t-statistic 
with p-values in brackets). 
 
    
Variables PIPE Sample 
Compustat Sample 
(Non-PIPE 
issuers) 
Wilcoxon rank 
sums z-statistic 
PIPE Proceeds ratio (%) 25.72   
Gross stock issues ratio (%) 34.87 21.98 7.31 (<.0001) 
Cash flow ratio (%) 0.98 1.34 -11.08 (<.0001) 
Issuance of new long-term debt ratio 
(%) 
0 0.24 -65.73 (<.0001) 
Cash ratio (%) 25 8.15 51.62 (<.0001) 
Leverage ratio (%) 37.15 43.73 -14.09 (<.0001) 
Market-to-book ratio 7.09 1.71 95.96 (<.0001) 
R&D ratio (%) 13.14 3.66 44.52 (<.0001) 
CAPEX ratio (%) 2.57 3.96 -20.77 (<.0001) 
Sales ratio (%) 62.75 82.49 -18.73 (<.0001) 
Repurchase ratio (%) 0 0 -24.49 (<.0001) 
Acquisitions ratio (%) 0 0 -11.50 (<.0001) 
Tangibility ratio (%) 20.98 37.59 -29.44 (<.0001) 
Net assets ($m) 34.25 123.16 -32.78 (<.0001) 
Dividends ratio (%) 0 0 -55.45 (<.0001) 
Observations 7,636 125,706  
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Table II 
Firm Characteristics by Frequency of PIPE Transactions  
Table II displays separate descriptive statistics for firms sorted based on the number of PIPE transactions during 
the sample period. The PIPE proceeds ratio is PIPE gross proceeds to total assets, other stock issuances ratio is 
net cash flow from non-PIPE and non-SEO proceeds (gross proceeds from stock issues minus proceeds from 
PIPE issues minus proceeds from SEOs minus stock repurchases), SEO proceeds ratio is total common stock 
gross public offerings’ proceeds over total assets, sales ratio is sales over total assets, cash ratio is cash and cash 
equivalents over total assets, repurchase ratio is the purchase of common and preferred stock over total assets, 
acquisitions ratio is the cash amount spent on acquisitions over total assets, tangibility ratio is net PPE minus 
inventories over total assets, net assets is total assets minus cash, CAPEX ratio is capital expenditures over total 
assets, R&D ratio is research and development expenditures over total assets, leverage ratio is the sum of long-
term and short-term debt over total assets, issuance of new long-term debt ratio is the total issuance of new 
long-term debt over total assets, cash flow ratio is the sum of income before extraordinary items, depreciation 
and R&D expenses over total assets. PIPE proceeds ratio and SEO proceeds ratio are average values across all 
firm-years, and all other values are medians across firm-years. All variables except the market-to-book ratio are 
scaled by lagged total assets.  
 
Variables 
Firms with 1 PIPE 
transaction 
Firms with 2 PIPE 
transactions 
Firms with 3 PIPE 
transactions 
Firms with more than 
3 PIPE transactions 
PIPE proceeds ratio (%) 14.10 23.00 24.46 39.01 
SEO proceeds ratio (%) 2.89 3.96 4.57 4.47 
Other stock issues ratio (%) 0.09 0.19 0.37 0.45 
Cash flow ratio (%) 7.72 2.02 1.45 -8.24 
New long-term debt issuance ratio (%) 0 0 0 0 
Cash ratio (%) 16.62 24.99 26.66 37.47 
Market-to-book ratio 7.07 6.32 7.43 7.48 
R&D ratio (%) 7.70 10.65 13.24 24.17 
CAPEX ratio (%) 2.91 2.61 2.65 2.21 
Sales ratio (%) 93.16 79.61 68.77 39.20 
Repurchase ratio (%) 0 0 0 0 
Acquisitions ratio (%) 0 0 0 0 
Tangibility ratio (%) 26.31 21.39 20.49 16.61 
Net assets ($ M) 85.27 37.43 31.49 18.13 
Observations 2,566 1,435 1,000 2,634 
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Table III 
Private Equity Inflows and Firm-level Investment:  Pooled OLS Regressions  
 
Table III presents pooled OLS estimates from regressing - in six separate estimation models -'R&D' R&D 
expenditures, 'Capx' capital expenditures, 'Acquire' cash acquisition expenditures, 'dCash' the change of the 
stock of cash holdings, 'dWC' the change in non-cash working capital (computed as the current assets minus 
current liabilities minus cash holdings) and 'LtDbtReduct' the reduction in long-term debt, on the following 
independent variables: 'PIPE' PIPE gross proceeds amounts, 'Q' the lagged market to book ratio, 'Ln(Assets)' the 
lagged book value of assets (logged), 'Sales' revenues, 'CashFlow' gross cash flow (income before extraordinary 
items plus depreciation plus R&D), 'dCash' the change in cash reserves, 'NewLTDebt' net new long-term debt 
issuances (computed as the difference between new long-term debt issuances and long-term debt reductions), 
'SEO' common stock SEO gross proceeds amounts, 'OtherStk' net cash flow from non-PIPE and non-SEO 
proceeds (gross proceeds from stock issues minus proceeds from PIPE issues minus proceeds from SEOs minus 
stock repurchases). All variables are scaled by the lagged value of total assets except Ln(Assets) and Q. All 
ratios are winsorized at the 1% level. The regression controls for industry- and year-fixed effects, where 
industry effects are defined at the two-digit SIC level. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and with-
in firm serial correlation. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by *, ** and *** 
respectively. 
 
 
 Dependent variable: 
 R&Dt Capxt Acquiret dCasht dWCt LtDbtReductt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable       
DependentVart-1 0.394 0.343 0.100 -0.032 -0.095 0.399 
 (0.024)*** (0.028)*** (0.017)*** (0.011)*** (0.029)*** (0.085)*** 
PIPEt 0.180 0.051 0.070 0.557 0.130 0.040 
 (0.019)*** (0.007)*** (0.009)*** (0.024)*** (0.019)*** (0.014)*** 
Qt-1 0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.008 0.000 -0.003 
 (0.002)** (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.003)** (0.002) (0.001)*** 
Ln(Assets)t-1 -0.016 0.002 0.006 0.016 0.002 0.004 
 (0.003)*** (0.001)* (0.001)*** (0.004)*** (0.002) (0.003) 
Salest -0.007 0.010 0.022 0.049 0.004 0.028 
 (0.005) (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.008)*** (0.006) (0.007)*** 
CashFlowt 0.033 0.017 0.032 0.153 0.173 0.007 
 (0.017)** (0.007)** (0.006)*** (0.027)*** (0.020)*** (0.009) 
dCasht -0.023 -0.018 -0.084  -0.110 -0.022 
 (0.018) (0.007)** (0.010)***  (0.018)*** (0.013)* 
NewLTDebtt 0.092 0.071 0.192 0.323 0.010 0.027 
 (0.029)*** (0.014)*** (0.022)*** (0.051)*** (0.032) (0.030) 
SEOt 0.141 0.061 0.116 0.843 0.101 0.046 
 (0.025)*** (0.011)*** (0.017)*** (0.050)*** (0.022)*** (0.019)** 
OtherStkt 0.159 0.056 0.085 0.535 0.104 0.026 
 (0.023)*** (0.010)*** (0.011)*** (0.039)*** (0.028)*** (0.024) 
Constant 0.015 0.011 -0.145 -0.253 -0.023 -0.047 
 (0.039) (0.022) (0.022)*** (0.087)*** (0.028) (0.022)** 
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Observations 4,535 5,979 5,830 6,017 5,974 4,737 
 R-squared 0.651 0.536 0.216 0.560 0.155 0.263 
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Table IV 
Private Equity Inflows and Cumulative Corporate Expenditures 
 
Table IV presents estimates from regressions that measure the cumulative impact in the years that follow PIPE 
inflows. The dependent variable Y is the cumulative use of funds measured over one, two, and three year 
intervals following the PIPE issue. For R&D, fixed investment, acquisitions, and long-term debt reduction, Y is 
the sum of new spending over the relevant interval. For cash holdings and non-cash working capital, Y is the 
change in the level relative to t=0. Other sources include new cash inflows to the firm from internal cash flows 
and new stock and debt issues. All regressions are estimated with OLS and include year and industry fixed 
effects. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and with-in firm serial correlation are reported in 
parenthesis. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by *, ** and ***. The number 
of observations and R-squared from the regression are in brackets. 
 
 
 Y = 1ln[(PIPE proceeds/TA0) + 1] + 2ln[(other sources/TA0) + 1] +3ln(TA0) + Year + 
Industry + e 
  
Y = sum_R&D sum_Capx sum_Acquire dCash dWC sum_ 
LtDbtReductt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
 OLS estimates of 1 
Interval after IPO (t=0):       
       
t=1 0.255 0.065 0.043 0.740 0.068 0.024 
 (0.015)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.023)*** (0.028)** (0.009)*** 
 [4431,  0.517] [5818, 0.474] [5728, 0.170] [5834, 0.428] [5782, 0.064] [5835, 0.098] 
       
t=1 to t=2 0.386 0.102 0.058 0.513 0.002 0.037 
 (0.022)*** (0.016)*** (0.017)*** (0.034)*** (0.037) (0.014)*** 
 [3331, 0.631] [4362, 0.550] [4260, 0.217] [4379, 0.452] [4326, 0.055] [4379, 0.156] 
       
t=1 to t=3 0.469 0.109 0.056 0.398 -0.039 0.040 
 (0.034)*** (0.021)*** (0.025)*** (0.057)*** (0.041) (0.022)* 
 [2452, 0.673] [3210, 0.595] [3114, 0.233] [3224, 0.501] [3174, 0.064] [3224, 0.207] 
 
 34 
 
Table V 
Private Equity Inflows and Firm-Level Investment: GMM Estimates 
 
Table V reports GMM estimates from regressing - in six separate estimation models -'R&D' R&D expenditures, 
'Capx' capital expenditures, 'Acquire' cash acquisition expenditures, 'dCash' the change of the stock of cash 
holdings, 'dWC' the change in non-cash working capital (computed as the current assets minus current liabilities 
minus cash holdings) and 'LtDbtReduct' the reduction in long-term debt, on the following independent 
variables: 'PIPE' PIPE gross proceeds amounts, 'Q' the lagged market to book ratio, 'Ln(Assets)' the lagged book 
value of assets (logged), 'Sales' revenues, 'CashFlow' gross cash flow (income before extraordinary items plus 
depreciation plus R&D), 'dCash' the change in cash reserves, 'NewLTDebt' net new long-term debt issuances 
(computed as the difference between new long-term debt issuances and long-term debt reductions), 'SEO' 
common stock SEO gross proceeds amounts, 'OtherStk' net cash flow from non-PIPE and non-SEO proceeds 
(gross proceeds from stock issues minus proceeds from PIPE issues minus proceeds from SEOs minus stock 
repurchases). All variables are scaled by the lagged value of total assets except Ln(Assets) and Q. All ratios are 
winsorized at the 1% level. The regression controls for firm- and year-fixed effects. Estimation is by systems 
GMM with lagged levels dated t-2 to t-4 used as instruments for the regression equation in first differences and 
lagged differences dated t-1 used to instrument the equation in levels. The J-test is a test of the null hypothesis 
that the over-identifying restrictions are valid, the diff-Hansen is a test of the null that the instruments used for 
the levels equation are valid, and m2 is test for second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals.  
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and with-in firm serial correlation. Statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable: 
 R&Dt Capxt Acquiret dCasht dWCt LtDbtReductt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable       
DependentVart-1 0.233 0.310 0.047 -0.006 -0.021 0.176 
 (0.032)*** (0.037)*** (0.023)** (0.013) (0.040) (0.064)*** 
PIPEt  0.263 0.051 0.042 0.604 0.134 -0.008 
 (0.036)*** (0.015)*** (0.013)*** (0.041)*** (0.036)*** (0.018) 
Qt-1 0.002 -0.000 -0.002 0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002)* 
Ln(Assets)t-1 -0.044 0.016 0.010 0.033 0.000 -0.008 
 (0.012)*** (0.005)*** (0.003)*** (0.015)** (0.010) (0.007) 
Salest -0.053 0.035 0.019 0.108 0.015 0.026 
 (0.015)*** (0.006)*** (0.008)** (0.022)*** (0.014) (0.010)*** 
CashFlowt 0.054 -0.013 0.014 0.086 0.185 0.006 
 (0.028)* (0.014) (0.010) (0.049)* (0.040)*** (0.020) 
dCasht -0.080 -0.022 -0.075  -0.086 0.014 
 (0.036)** (0.014) (0.018)***  (0.036)** (0.020) 
NewLTDebtt 0.203 0.021 0.138 0.543 -0.039 -0.046 
 (0.053)*** (0.020) (0.033)*** (0.116)*** (0.075) (0.040) 
SEOt 0.251 0.052 0.160 1.001 0.081 0.052 
 (0.066)*** (0.028)* (0.042)*** (0.119)*** (0.071) (0.052) 
OtherStkt 0.271 0.061 0.060 0.562 0.102 -0.025 
 (0.043)*** (0.022)*** (0.017)*** (0.081)*** (0.059)* (0.027) 
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Observations 4,535 5,979 5,830 6,017 5,974 4,737 
Number of firms 964 1,309 1,290 1,312 1,306 1,107 
J-test 0.206 0.038 0.165 0.048 0.338 0.061 
Diff-Hansen 0.556 0.000 0.148 0.292 0.519 0.006 
m2 -1.23 1.13 1.34 -0.03 -1.31 0.54 
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Table VI 
Private Equity Inflows and Firm-Level Investment for Frequent and Infrequent PIPE 
Issuers: Dynamic GMM Estimates 
Table VI reports GMM estimates from regressing - in six separate estimation models -'R&D' R&D 
expenditures, 'Capx' capital expenditures, 'Acquire' cash acquisition expenditures, 'dCash' the change of the 
stock of cash holdings, 'dWC' the change in non-cash working capital (computed as the current assets minus 
current liabilities minus cash holdings) and 'LtDbtReduct' the reduction in long-term debt, on the following 
independent variables: 'PIPE' PIPE gross proceeds amounts, 'Q' the lagged market to book ratio, 'Ln(Assets)' the 
lagged book value of assets (logged), 'Sales' revenues, 'CashFlow' gross cash flow (income before extraordinary 
items plus depreciation plus R&D), 'dCash' the change in cash reserves, 'NewLTDebt' net new long-term debt 
issuances (computed as the difference between new long-term debt issuances and long-term debt reductions), 
'SEO' common stock SEO gross proceeds amounts, 'OtherStk' net cash flow from non-PIPE and non-SEO 
proceeds (gross proceeds from stock issues minus proceeds from PIPE issues minus proceeds from SEOs minus 
stock repurchases). All variables are scaled by the lagged value of total assets except Ln(Assets) and Q. All 
ratios are winsorized at the 1% level. The regression controls for firm- and year-fixed effects. Estimation is by 
systems GMM with lagged levels dated t-2 to t-4 used as instruments for the regression equation in first 
differences and lagged differences dated t-1 used to instrument the equation in levels. The J-test is a test of the 
null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid, the diff-Hansen is a test of the null that the 
instruments used for the levels equation are valid, and m2 is test for second-order autocorrelation in the first-
differenced residuals.  Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and with-in firm serial correlation. 
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. Results in 
Panel A are for firms with at least three PIPE transactions during the sample period; results for firms with either 
one or two PIPE issues are in Panel B. 
 Dependent variable: 
 R&Dt Capxt Acquiret dCasht dWCt LtDbtReductt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Panel A:  Frequent PIPE Issuers Only  
DependentVart-1 0.240 0.384 0.044 -0.014 -0.077 0.232 
 (0.032)*** (0.049)*** (0.034) (0.016) (0.048) (0.105)** 
PIPEt  0.224 0.042 0.048 0.607 0.095 -0.006 
 (0.036)*** (0.017)** (0.015)*** (0.047)*** (0.036)*** (0.019) 
Qt-1 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.009 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) 
Ln(Assets)t-1 -0.060 0.011 0.015 0.038 0.006 -0.012 
 (0.015)*** (0.005)** (0.004)*** (0.018)** (0.012) (0.011) 
Salest -0.066 0.022 0.029 0.071 0.020 0.032 
 (0.019)*** (0.006)*** (0.008)*** (0.027)*** (0.018) (0.016)** 
CashFlowt 0.024 -0.008 0.013 0.178 0.140 0.013 
 (0.027) (0.018) (0.011) (0.055)*** (0.045)*** (0.016) 
dCasht -0.053 -0.014 -0.068  -0.047 0.009 
 (0.033) (0.016) (0.018)***  (0.039) (0.020) 
NewLTDebtt 0.189 0.008 0.124 0.540 -0.100 -0.031 
 (0.055)*** (0.023) (0.033)*** (0.124)*** (0.077) (0.040) 
SEOt 0.225 0.063 0.138 0.870 0.017 0.010 
 (0.065)*** (0.023)*** (0.040)*** (0.125)*** (0.063) (0.037) 
OtherStkt 0.273 0.054 0.070 0.569 0.044 -0.025 
 (0.039)*** (0.023)** (0.021)*** (0.081)*** (0.052) (0.030) 
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 2,605 3,148 3,094 3,167 3,151 2,644 
Number of firms 447 545 538 545 544 524 
J-test 0.924 0.387 0.775 0.612 0.864 0.539 
Diff-Hansen 0.834 0.882 0.942 1.000 0.998 1.000 
m2 -1.60 -0.55 0.63 -1.01 -0.63 1.07 
  
 36 
 
 Table VI – continued 
 Dependent variable: 
 R&Dt Capxt Acquiret dCasht dWCt LtDbtReductt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Panel B: Infrequent PIPE Issuers Only 
DependentVart-1 0.232 0.270 0.049 -0.032 0.009 0.158 
 (0.052)*** (0.045)*** (0.024)** (0.021) (0.053) (0.090)* 
PIPEt  0.088 0.087 0.096 0.582 0.267 0.133 
 (0.060) (0.046)* (0.036)*** (0.098)*** (0.125)** (0.067)** 
Qt-1 0.009 -0.001 -0.001 0.019 -0.003 -0.009 
 (0.004)*** (0.002) (0.003) (0.008)** (0.006) (0.003)*** 
Ln(Assets)t-1 -0.013 0.008 0.007 0.022 0.006 0.008 
 (0.009) (0.004)** (0.004)* (0.012)* (0.010) (0.006) 
Salest -0.039 0.022 0.020 0.097 0.007 0.034 
 (0.014)*** (0.009)** (0.008)** (0.021)*** (0.013) (0.013)*** 
CashFlowt 0.064 0.008 0.024 0.028 0.205 -0.029 
 (0.028)** (0.021) (0.015) (0.051) (0.055)*** (0.018) 
dCasht -0.004 -0.022 -0.123  -0.233 -0.074 
 (0.029) (0.020) (0.039)***  (0.045)*** (0.048) 
NewLTDebtt 0.057 0.077 0.257 0.440 0.086 0.046 
 (0.049) (0.043)* (0.058)*** (0.133)*** (0.092) (0.063) 
SEOt 0.111 0.092 0.173 0.853 0.254 0.250 
 (0.055)** (0.038)** (0.068)** (0.170)*** (0.060)*** (0.134)* 
OtherStkt 0.081 0.068 0.086 0.472 0.310 0.101 
 (0.046)* (0.027)** (0.031)*** (0.097)*** (0.099)*** (0.064) 
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Observations 1,930 2,831 2,736 2,850 2,823 2,093 
Number of firms 517 764 752 767 762 583 
J-test 1.000 0.979 0.973 0.999 0.909 0.985 
Diff-Hansen 1.000 0.931 0.782 0.999 1.000 0.936 
m2 1.50 1.33 0.96 1.38 -2.26 -0.20 
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Table VII 
Private Equity Financing and Firm-Level Investment by Investor Type: Dynamic 
GMM Estimates 
 
Table VII eports GMM estimates from regressing - in six separate estimation models -'R&D' R&D 
expenditures, 'Capx' capital expenditures, 'Acquire' cash acquisition expenditures, 'dCash' the change of the 
stock of cash holdings, 'dWC' the change in non-cash working capital (computed as the current assets minus 
current liabilities minus cash holdings) and 'LtDbtReduct' the reduction in long-term debt, on the following 
independent variables: 'PIPE' PIPE gross proceeds amounts, 'Q' the lagged market to book ratio, 'Ln(Assets)' the 
lagged book value of assets (logged), 'Sales' revenues, 'CashFlow' gross cash flow (income before extraordinary 
items plus depreciation plus R&D), 'dCash' the change in cash reserves, 'NewLTDebt' net new long-term debt 
issuances (computed as the difference between new long-term debt issuances and long-term debt reductions), 
'SEO' common stock SEO gross proceeds amounts, 'OtherStk' net cash flow from non-PIPE and non-SEO 
proceeds (gross proceeds from stock issues minus proceeds from PIPE issues minus proceeds from SEOs minus 
stock repurchases). All variables are scaled by the lagged value of total assets except Ln(Assets) and Q. All 
ratios are winsorized at the 1% level. The regression controls for firm- and year-fixed effects. Estimation is by 
systems GMM with lagged levels dated t-2 to t-4 used as instruments for the regression equation in first 
differences and lagged differences dated t-1 used to instrument the equation in levels. The J-test is a test of the 
null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid, the diff-Hansen is a test of the null that the 
instruments used for the levels equation are valid, and m2 is test for second-order autocorrelation in the first-
differenced residuals.  Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and with-in firm serial correlation. 
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. In panels A 
and B the primary supplier of finance is based on the lead PIPE investor during the firm’s first PIPE transaction.  
In panels C and D only firms with more than one PIPE transaction are included.   
 Dependent variable: 
 R&Dt Capxt Acquiret dCasht dWCt LtDbtReductt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Panel A:  Firms that rely on primarily on PIPE funding supplied by hedge funds 
  
PIPEt 0.258 0.054 0.061 0.645 0.164 0.031 
 (0.034)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.037)*** (0.037)*** (0.022) 
 [0.998; 1.000] [0.836; 1.000] [0.794; 0.996] [0.954; 1.000] [0.989; 1.000] [0.984; 1.000] 
obs 2069 2564 2500 2575 2565 2055 
       
 Panel B:  Firms that rely on primarily on PIPE funding  supplied by sources besides hedge funds 
  
PIPEt 0.207 0.081 0.086 0.685 0.130 0.024 
 (0.036)*** (0.022)*** (0.025)** (0.053)*** (0.049)*** (0.028) 
 [1.000; 1.000] [0.999; 0.996] [1.000; 1.000] [1.000; 0.999] [1.000; 0.992] [0.993; 0.998] 
obs 1599 2063 2015 2079 2068 1662 
  
 Panel C:  Firms that use the same supplier of PIPE funding across multiple rounds 
  
PIPEt 0.130 0.070 0.073 0.720 0.147 0.030 
 (0.081) (0.024)*** (0.035)** (0.076)*** (0.062)** (0.035) 
 [1.000; 1.000] [1.000; 1.000] [1.000; 1.000] [1.000; 1.000] [1.000; 1.000] [1.000; 1.000] 
obs 187 296 288 296 296 225 
  
 Panel D:  Firms that switch suppliers of PIPE funding across multiple rounds 
  
PIPEt 0.247 0.052 0.031 0.583 0.113 -0.010 
 (0.039)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)** (0.044)*** (0.041)*** (0.016) 
 [0.699; 0.993] [0.408; 0.432] [0.277; 0.852] [0.176; 0.510] [0.710; 0.502] [0.185; 0.193] 
obs 3106 3930 3833 3953 3918 3192 
 
